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Chapter 6: The Built Environment
by Justin Gundlach* & Jennifer Klein**
Abstract

The built environment, which includes not only buildings but infrastructure, mediates
several important climate impacts on public health and is also subject to diverse legal
requirements. It is a subject of particular focus for policy efforts aimed at promoting adaptive
responses to climate change on the part of institutions and individuals. This chapter presents key
examples of public health impacts that arise from climate change but are mediated—possibly
mitigated, possibly exacerbated—by elements of the build environment. It also describes the
process and substance of adaptive responses to those impacts. Having presented these physical
and policy contexts in its first Section, this chapter’s second Section considers the role the law
could play as individuals, organizations, and localities react to climate-driven harms and seek to
adapt.
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Introduction
The built environment—meaning buildings and the infrastructure systems on which they
and their occupants rely1—arises from layered human decisions.2 In 2008, a team of public
health researchers put it this way:
Distinct from the natural environment, the built environment is comprised [sic] of
manmade components of people’s surroundings, from small-scale settings (e.g.,
offices, houses, hospitals, shopping malls, and schools) to large-scale settings
(e.g., neighborhoods, communities, and cities), as well as roads, sidewalks, green
spaces, and connecting transit systems. The development of the built environment
involves many sectors, including urban planning, architecture, engineering, local
and regional governments, transportation design, environmental psychology, and
land conservation.3
They also noted, of course, that “[t]he built environment influences human choices, which in turn
affect health,” specifically, “physical activity, respiratory and cardiac health, injury risk, chronic
disease risk, social connectedness, and mental health. . . .”4 However, because all social and
economic institutions rely to some degree on the built environment,5 as climate change redraws
shorelines and modifies seasons, temperatures, and weather patterns, the responsive changes to
the built environment will implicate a host of interests, public health just one among them.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses key climate impacts on
public health that are mediated in some way by the built environment. It also discusses the
process and substance of adaptive responses to those impacts. The second part considers the role
the law could play as individuals, organizations, and localities react to climate-driven harms and
seek to adapt.
Before proceeding to those discussions, it is important to first define some key terms.
Climate change is the basic cause of a large number of immediate and intermediate effects—that
1

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 1190, Community Resilience Planning Guide
for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems vol. I, at 13 (May. 2016), https://perma.cc/ZVH7-GEJ2.
2
William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis 62 (1991) (contrasting the natural environment, or “first nature,” with
“structures of the human economy,” or “second nature”).
3
Margalit Younger et al., The Built Environment, Climate Change, and Health: Opportunities for Co-Benefits, 35(5)
Am. J. Preventive Med. 517-26, 517 (2008).
4
Id.
5
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 1190, Community Resilience Planning Guide
for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems vol. II, at 27 tbl. 10-4 (Oct. 2015), https://perma.cc/ZVH7-GEJ2 (providing
thorough list of links between institutions and buildings, including direct and indirect impacts arising from damage
to buildings).
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is, effects that cause further effects. The public health and disaster management communities
have developed terminology that is useful to climate change adaptation policymakers who must
sort through the problem of which effects/causes to address and how to track and coordinate
adaptation efforts’ success.6 In this lexicon, stressor and hazard both refer to an underlying
cause, such as rising ambient temperatures. Stressor tends to refer to chronic and slow-moving
causes;7 hazard is applicable both to slow-moving causes, such as drought, and sudden-onset
causes such as destructive coastal storms. If drought or storms strike in a location far removed
from human populations or development, then there is no exposure to them. The degree of
exposure to a stressor or hazard varies with location and the ability of people or structures in that
location to endure it without disruption—thus, someone with central air conditioning who works
indoors might not be highly exposed to extreme heat even if her location experiences a heat
wave.8 Among the populations and assets that are exposed and cannot mitigate or avoid that
exposure, some are more sensitive—that is, susceptible or unable to cope—than others. For
instance, as noted in Chapter 3, children, the elderly, and the disabled are generally physically
less able to endure hazards such as heat or air quality made worse by climate-driven stressors.
Those who are both sensitive and exposed are vulnerable. Some populations that are vulnerable
are also resilient, however, meaning that they are capable of recovering quickly from exposure to
a hazard even though they are vulnerable to it.9
I. Adapting the built environment to address public health impacts of climate change
This sub-section begins with a description of key public health impacts of climate change
that relate directly to the built environment. It is not meant to be exhaustive and seeks to avoid
redundancy with the descriptions of impacts covered by other chapters. After providing that brief
survey of impacts, it addresses the task of adapting the built environment in response to those
impacts. It begins by noting how various frameworks would organize that task, and then

6

B.L. Turner II et al., A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science, 100 Proceedings Nat’l
Academy Sci. 8074 (2003), 10.1073/pnas.1231335100; see also Janet L. Gamble et al., U.S. Global Change
Research Program, Populations of Concern, in The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United
States: A Scientific Assessment 247, 249 (Alison Crimmins et al., eds., 2016).
7
But see Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Energy, A Review of Climate Change
Vulnerability Assessments: Current Practices and Lessons Learned from DOE’s Partnership for Energy Sector
Climate Resilience 10–12 (May 2016), https://perma.cc/G3YB-R546 (referring to sudden and slow-onset climatedriven effects as “stressors”).
8
See, e.g., Amiche Alcindor, In Sweltering South, Climate Change Is Now a Workplace Hazard, N.Y. Times, Aug.
3, 2017, https://perma.cc/4ULU-DXRQ (“They don’t know what’s going on . . . because they are in cool houses and
in offices,” Mr. Guerra said.”).
9
UNISDR, 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009); see also UNISDR, The Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (2015),
https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf; Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, Extract from the final report of the World
Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6) (2005),
http://www.unisdr.org/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf.
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examines key elements of the process and substance of adaptation efforts focused on the built
environment.
A. Key examples of climate-driven public health impacts transmitted by the built
environment
Atop the list of issues that adaptation planning must address in the built environment are
public health vulnerabilities traceable to the following hazards: too much water due to sea level
rise and/or extreme precipitation; temperatures that are more variable and generally higher; too
little water, i.e., drought; and extreme events such as storms and wildfires.10 Exposure to these
hazards takes a variety of forms. Some are direct, such as outdoor workers encountering long
periods of hot and humid weather. Others, particularly where the climate-driven stressor interacts
with other hazards, are indirect, such as outdoor or indoor air quality made worse by higher
temperatures boosting air pollution levels, mold growth promoted by more heat and humidity in
buildings, or exposure to toxic waste introduced into the environment by the flooding of a
brownfield or a waste storage facility located on a coastline. Still other vulnerabilities that arise
from indirect exposure to hazards owe to those hazards’ disruption of infrastructure: transit
systems, road networks, drinking water provision, wastewater management, and electricity
distribution.11
Rather than attempting a comprehensive review of how climate change adaptation efforts
respond to the diverse climate-driven hazards and vulnerabilities that bear upon and are mediated
by the built environment, this chapter focuses on two hazards in particular: hotter ambient
temperatures; and coastal flooding driven by sea level rise (SLR).12
1. Heat
Cities amplify the direct effects of hotter ambient temperatures driven by climate change;
this phenomenon is termed the urban heat island effect.13 In cities, asphalt, concrete, and other
artificial surfaces with low albedo (reflectivity) absorb solar radiation and then express it as heat,
10

Many of the climate-driven vulnerabilities related directly to the built environment are described at length in
Chapters 3, 7 (heat), 8 (storms), 9 (infectious disease), and 10 (food and agriculture) of this volume. See also S.L.
Cutter et al., Ch. 11: Urban Systems, Infrastructure, and Vulnerability, in Climate Change Impacts in the United
States: The Third National Climate Assessment (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014).
11
See NOAA, U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit: Built Environment, https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/builtenvironment (accessed July 1, 2017).
12
Riverine flooding driven by severe precipitation and early snowmelts, wildfires, and drought are all also examples
of climate change-driven impacts that affect public health via the built environment. This chapter recognizes the
importance and relevance of these impacts, see, e.g., Dennis M. Knobloch, Moving a Community in the Aftermath of
the Great 1993 Midwest Flood, 130 J. Contemporary Water Res. & Edu. 41 (Mar. 2005), https://perma.cc/39T9VTTV, but space constraints put discussion of them beyond its scope.
13
See Joyce Klein-Rosenthal + Jeffrey Raven, Urban Heat And Urban Design — An Opportunity To Transform In
NYC, The Sallan Foundation: Snapshot, July 18, 2017, https://perma.cc/X45Q-RDRR (describing effect and its
causes).
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and the relative (or total) absence of vegetation often means that these surfaces are largely
unshaded and are not cooled through the evapotranspiration of moisture. Cities’ absorptive
capacity for heat is compounded by urban layouts that obstruct cooling breezes, and by the
presence of people, vehicles, and other heat sources—including, during warm seasons, air
conditioning units.14
Within and beyond the bounds of cities, hotter temperatures also impair the functioning
of transportation systems and electricity infrastructure.15 Those systems’ vulnerability to heat
compounds the heat-related vulnerabilities of people and assets that rely on their smooth
operation. Thus, these vulnerable systems can be the source of indirect adverse public health
effects.
The other key indirect effects of hotter temperatures result from their contribution to
poorer outdoor and indoor air quality—a leading scourge of public health.16 This relates to the
built environment because, as discussed in Chapters 3, 7, and 13, hotter temperatures promote
ozone formation in places downwind of roads, power plants, and other sources of nitrogen oxides
and volatile organic compounds17—a hazard to which children and the elderly are especially
vulnerable.18 More frequent or intense precipitation and/or flooding can also promote mold
growth indoors, which in turn can visit an array of adverse public health impacts on residents.19
2. Coastal flooding
Recent events in the Northeast, Florida, and Louisiana illustrate the vulnerabilities
traceable to the coastal flooding that is being made ever more severe and frequent by rising sea
levels and intensifying coastal storms.

14

Id.
Sofia Aivalioti, Electricity Sector Adaptation to Heat Waves (Jan. 2015), https://perma.cc/ZML6-3QVQ; Henry
G. Schwartz, Michael Meyer, et al., Ch. 5: Transportation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The
Third National Climate Assessment 130, 132–33 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) (noting effects of heat on roads,
bridges, rails, and aircraft performance).
16
Philip J. Landrigan, Air pollution and health, The Lancet: Public Health 2(1) e4-e5 (Jan. 2017) (“Air pollution is
one of the great killers of our age.”); Frank J. Kelly & Julia C. Fussell, Air pollution and public health: emerging
hazards and improved understanding of risk, 37(4) Environmental Geochemistry & Health 631–649 (2015).
17
James N. Galloway & William H. Schlesinger et al., Ch. 15: Biogeochemical Cycles, in Climate Change Impacts
in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment 350, 357 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) (“Rates of
ozone formation are ac- celerated by higher temperatures, creating a reinforcing cycle between rising temperatures
and continued human alteration of the nitrogen and carbon cycles. Rising temperatures also work against some of
the benefits of air pollution control.”).
18
Radley Horton & Gary Yohe et al., Ch. 16: Northeast, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third
National Climate Assessment 371, 377 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014).
15

19

George Luber & Kim Knowlton et al., Ch. 9: Human Health, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The
Third National Climate Assessment 220, 222 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014).
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Superstorm Sandy,20 which struck the New Jersey and New York coasts in November
2012, drowned dozens of people, destroyed hundreds and damaged thousands of coastal homes
and businesses, and wreaked damage and severe disruptions on transit and electricity systems,
wastewater treatment plants, and other assets and infrastructure.21 Acute public health impacts
included injury, death, exacerbated illnesses, and “bypass events” (i.e., flows of raw sewage into
coastal waters) resulting from the powering down of several wastewater treatment plants.
Longer-term public health impacts included mold growth in flooded homes and various adverse
mental and physical health effects of residents’ displacement from their homes.22 Consistent with
the general distributional pattern of disasters’ impacts, Sandy was disproportionately hard on
poorer neighborhoods and people with disabilities.23
Miami Beach and Miami are among the cities most notoriously vulnerable to the slowmoving SLR-driven hazards of nuisance flooding and the salt water infiltration of groundwater
resources,24 though they are not alone.25 Nuisance flooding visits substantial cumulative damage
on stormwater and wastewater management systems, and can also facilitate transmission of
infectious disease and exposure to toxic chemicals.26 Infiltration of groundwater by saltwater can
compromise drinking water systems relied upon by large populations.27 Though these results of

20

Although the storm’s wind speed rated at the low end of Category 1 hurricanes, its pressure rating was
comparable to that of a Category 3 hurricane. FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report Hurricane Sandy in New
Jersey and New York, at i (Nov. 2013), https://perma.cc/U5GH-LJ4M.
21
CDC, Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy — October–November 2012, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 62(20); 393-397, May 24, 2013, https://perma.cc/RH2M-K8GM; FEMA, 6 Months Report: Superstorm
Sandy from Pre-Disaster to Recovery, Apr. 25, 2013, https://perma.cc/SA37-QGN3.
22

John Manuel, The Long Road to Recovery: Environmental Health Impacts of Hurricane Sandy, Environmental
Health Perspectives 121:A152–A159 (2013), https://perma.cc/D6VE-VXE9 (“Of the long-term health threats posed
by Sandy, the most significant is mold growth in homes that were not properly remediated after flooding.”). Recent
research highlights that the total costs of recovery from storms like Sandy greatly exceed those classified as disaster
aid in scale and duration, and that non-disaster costs arise from healthcare needs. Tatyana Deryugina, The Fiscal
Cost of Hurricanes: Disaster Aid versus Social Insurance, Am. Econ. J.: Economic Policy 9(3): 168–198 (2017),
https://perma.cc/GLF6-J4TN.
23

Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy at NYU School of Law, Sandy’s Effects on Housing in New York
City (Mar. 2013), https://perma.cc/2V4A-E4AV (reporting housing-related impacts of storm surge, broken down by
income level); see also Adrien A. Weibgen, Note: The Right To Be Rescued: Disability Justice in an Age of
Disaster, 124 Yale L.J. 2406 (2015) (discussing plight of elderly and disabled during Sandy and in the storm’s
aftermath).
24
David Smiley, Mainland Miami ponders returning neighborhoods to nature in order to survive rising seas, Miami
Herald, June 9, 2017, https://perma.cc/4A9F-QE6W.
25
William V. Sweet & John J. Marra, NOAA, 2015 State of U.S. “Nuisance” Tidal Flooding (June 2016),
http://perma.cc/9PHH-2ZJ6 (reporting on prevalence and severity of phenomenon across U.S.).
26
Stephanie Kruel, The Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Tidal Flooding in Boston, Massachusetts, 32(6) J. Coastal Res.
1302-09, 1308 (Nov. 2016), https://perma.cc/3D2A-45K5 (listing among public health risks of recurrent flooding:
transmission of infectious diseases, exposure to toxic chemicals, growth of mold in residences).
27
Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change
Adaptation, 51 Widener L. Rev. 521 (2010); see also chapters 8 and 9 of this volume.
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SLR are generally not a source of dramatic images or news stories, their cumulative impacts on
infrastructure are often just as destructive.28
Populations in coastal Louisiana—rural and urban alike—face a combination of impacts,
some of them climate-driven. Those populations endured the flooding that accompanied
hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, followed by the slower-emerging impacts of toxic spills
resulting from those storms.29 In addition, they continue to experience significant land loss due to
rapid subsidence,30 which has lately been exacerbated by oil spills’ damage to coastal
vegetation—a natural buffer to storms and source of coastal stability.31 Thus SLR and more
intense storms act as stressors on coastal Louisiana’s existing vulnerabilities.32
B. Adapting to those impacts and others
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, having examined examples of
adaptation efforts around the world, stated that “[t]here is no single approach to adaptation
planning because of the complex, diverse, and context-dependent nature of adaptation to climate
change.”33 This makes it difficult to distill a general description of adaptation efforts down to a
brief summary. However, it is possible—and useful—to take note of the key dimensions of
adaptation efforts identified by researchers examining numerous programs funded by the U.N.’s
Global Environment Facilities:
 timing relative to stimulus (anticipatory, concurrent, reactive);
 intent (autonomous, planned);
 spatial scope (local, regional, national);
 form (e.g., technological, behavioral, financial, institutional); and

28

Hamed R. Moftakhari et al., Cumulative hazard: The case of nuisance ﬂooding, Earth’s Future, 5,214–223 (2017),
doi:10.1002/2016EF000494.
29
Mark Schleifstein, Extent of oil spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is still being assessed, Times-Picayune,
Aug. 19, 2010, https://perma.cc/62D8-J6MP.
30
Jaap H. Nienhuis et al., A New Subsidence Map for Coastal Louisiana, 27 GSA Today (May 2017),
https://perma.cc/6G93-5W9A (“the fundamental culprit is the isolation of the sediment-delivery system (the
Mississippi River) from its delta plain and the adjacent coastal zone due to the construction of flood-protection
levees. As a result, the majority of the sediment carried by this system is funneled into the deep waters of the Gulf of
Mexico, rather than offsetting the naturally occurring high subsidence rates.”).
31
U.S. Geological Survey, USGS, NASA Study Finds Widespread Coastal Land Losses from Gulf Oil Spill, Nov.
17, 2016, https://perma.cc/FU92-8DX8 (identifying oiling of shorelines from oil spill and erosion due to coastal
storm as distinct, material causes of shoreline erosion).
32
Quantifying Vulnerability, LSU College of Engineering News, Apr. 4, 2013, https://perma.cc/XSC7-QZ7V
(discussing use of GIS mapping to identify where land subsidence is likely to compromise access to hurricane
evacuation routes).
33
Nobuo Mimura & Roger S. Pulwarty, et al., Adaptation Planning and Implementation, in Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (C.B. Field et al. eds. 2014) 869898, 871.
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degree of necessary change (incremental, transformational).34

As this list implies, the scope of adaptation efforts focused on the built environment
could encompass an enormous array of measures. One such might be a nationwide vulnerability
assessment for airports or rail transportation systems conducted in anticipation of coastal
flooding and heat waves that exceed parameters assumed by those systems’ current
engineering.35 Another might be a municipality’s adoption of a local ordinance that categorizes
green roofs as stormwater management infrastructure so that their installation can be funded—
like other capital expenses—using municipal bonds.36 Examples of measures responsive to the
impacts highlighted in part I.A.1 and 2 above are discussed in more detail in subpart I.B.3,
below.
1. Process
There is broad consensus on how adaptation efforts should—and do, in practice—
proceed;37 one pair of authors have called the steps involved a “ladder.”38 The highly
conventional steps include most or all of the following: identify hazards, assess vulnerabilities,
specify objectives, explore options, plan, implement, and evaluate. A large and growing number
of jurisdictions have undertaken at least some of these steps with respect to those portions of the
built environment for which they are responsible. However, few climb the full ladder: many have
identified hazards, fewer have assessed vulnerabilities, fewer still have translated the resulting
insights into plans and plans into actions, and very few have evaluated the effectiveness of those
actions.39 Notably, larger cities—which have more resources and can more readily dedicate staff
34

See Bonizella Biagini et al., A typology of adaptation actions: A global look at climate adaptation actions
financed through the Global Environment Facility, 25 Global Environmental Change 97-108 (Mar. 2014) Cf. City
and County of Denver, Climate Adaptation Plan (2014), https://perma.cc/FA34-H4XK (dividing adaptation
activities into short, medium, and long-term).
35
Cf. Henry G. Schwartz, Michael Meyer, et al., Ch. 5: Transportation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United
States: The Third National Climate Assessment 130-49, 133-34 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014).
36
See Justin Gundlach, Putting Green Infrastructure on Private Property in New York City, 28 ENVTL. L. IN
N.Y. 140, 148 (Sept. 2017) (noting financing challenges arising from accounting treatment of green infrastructure).
37
See, e.g., NOAA, U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit: Steps to Resilience, https://toolkit.climate.gov/#steps (accessed
Aug. 4, 2017); Helge Bormann et al., Guiding Regional Climate Adaptation in Coastal Areas, in Handbook of
Climate Change Adaptation 337, 350–52 (Walter Leal Filho ed. 2015); P.M. Groffman, et al., Ch. 8: Ecosystems,
Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Services, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate
Assessment (J.M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) 195-219, 202; Timothy Carter et al., Technical Guidelines for Assessing
Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, in IPCC, Climate Change 1995—Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of
Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses 823 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 1995).
38
E.M. Hamin & N. Gurran, Climbing the Adaptation Planning Ladder: Barriers and Enablers in Municipal
Planning, in Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation (W. Leal Filho, ed. 2015).
39
Several surveys of adaptation efforts by local governments report that many complete the initial steps of
identifying hazards but fewer conduct vulnerability assessments, fewer integrate their findings into planning efforts,
fewer still implement those plans, and very few evaluate those plans’ effectiveness. See John Nordgren et al.,
Supporting local climate change adaptation: Where we are and where we need to go, 66 Environmental Science &
Policy 344–52, 347 (Dec. 2016); Linda Shi et al., Global Patterns of Adaptation Planning: Results from a global
survey, in The Routledge Handbook of Urbanization and Global Environmental Change 336, 341–43 (Karen C. Seto
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to the task—are more likely than smaller localities to have undertaken a vulnerability assessment
and planning effort.40
Identifying hazards. An effort to adapt necessarily begins by surveying the current and
expected future climate in a particular area, and by identifying hazards potentially affecting the
population, assets, or infrastructure located there. The process requires interpreting both
historical data about the parameters of interest (e.g., temperature, flood risk) and data generated
by climate models that predict future climatic circumstances. Data of the latter sort are
challenging to derive with high degrees of accuracy for the Earth as a whole, and more so when
“climate model downscaling” focuses in on the smaller geographic area involved in any given
adaptation effort.41 Predictions are also consequential to publish because they can inform land
use and investment decisions.
Several publicly available tools can help an entity or jurisdiction identify hazards arising
from SLR, temperature and humidity changes, or changes in precipitation patterns,42 though
these tools tend to yield coarse projections at smaller scales.43 New York City’s Panel on Climate
Change (NPCC) has arguably set the gold standard for developing downscaled projections of
SLR, temperature, and precipitation.44 However, the NPCC is both an expensive endeavor and
one that, notwithstanding its relative superiority, generates projections subject to large

et al. eds. 2015) (reporting results from 2011 survey); National Association of Regional Councils, A Survey of
Regional Planning for Climate Adaptation (2012), https://perma.cc/K3WA-WDDJ.
40
Shi et al., supra note 39, at 341–43.
41
G. Flato et al., Evaluation of Climate Models, in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 741, 817
(T.F. Stocker et al. eds. 2013) (describing regional climate models as valid but emphasizing their sensitivity to
imprecise inputs: “This underlines the importance of both the quality of the boundary conditions and the
downscaling method.”).
42
See, e.g., NOAA, Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United States (Jan. 2017) (including
regional projections), https://perma.cc/N9AG-8Y6S; NOAA Office for Coastal Management, Sea Level Rise
Viewer, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/slr (accessed June 30, 2017); U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit,
MACA CMIP5 Statistically Downscaled Climate Projections, https://toolkit.climate.gov/tool/maca-cmip5statistically-downscaled-climate-projections (last updated Jan. 5, 2017); see also Climate Central, Surging Seas,
http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/ (accessed June 30, 2017).
43
The U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit homepage cautions that “[c]limate projections are not predictions,” that
“[t]he increased spatial resolution of statistically downscaled projections available for temperature and precipitation
may not be available for all parameters. In addition, increased resolution does not necessarily equate to greater
fidelity or reliability.” U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, MACA CMIP5 Statistically Downscaled Climate
Projections, https://toolkit.climate.gov/tool/maca-cmip5-statistically-downscaled-climate-projections (last updated
Jan. 5, 2017). It also counsels against DIY applications of downscaled modeling data: “For decisions involving the
use of climate model projections, you may want to consider seeking expertise.” Id.
44
See Building the Knowledge Base for Climate Resiliency: New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report,
1336 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (Jan. 2015). The third round of the panel’s reporting, NPCC3,
included sea level rise projections for three areas in southeastern New York State that have since been adopted by
the Department of Environmental Conservation and so must be considered in future planning decisions. See 6
NYCRR 490 (2017), http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/103877.html.
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uncertainties.45 Whatever data are used, the climate scenarios generated by this step provide
parameters useful to, for instance, departments of transportation that need to determine how high
to build a bridge, electric utilities that need to design components that can operate even during
long durations of high ambient temperatures, floodplain managers that want to guide land use
and design decisions for long-lived assets, and municipal authorities that need to match the
carrying capacity of a stormwater management system to the precipitation expected during its
useful life.
Assessing vulnerabilities. This step builds on the previous one by identifying conflicts
between projected climate parameters and the location or operation of existing people, assets,
and infrastructure. Whether it is being undertaken by an electricity distribution utility, 46 a city,
state, or federal agency,47 or some other entity, it tends to involve the rendering in layers of
several data sets over a geographic map. Consider the example in figure _, which excerpts just
two of the multiple maps collated by the Minnesota Department of Public Health in the
appendices of its Extreme Heat Toolkit.
Figure __. Map layers showing county-level vulnerability and adaptive capacity to heat.48

This pair of maps contains layers of information about the geographic density of a
subpopulation that is especially vulnerable to extreme heat (elderly who live alone), average
access to residential air conditioning across counties, and the location and availability of air
conditioned public spaces in those counties. Integrating data like these with data sets that capture
45

See, e.g., New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report [NPCC2]; Executive Summary, 1336 Annals of
N.Y. Acad. Sci. 9-17 (2015): at ES-10, n.e (no probabilities assigned to projected mean temperatures because of
multiple uncertain factors), ES-11 (frequency and intensity of coastal storms are “uncertain at local scales”), ES-13
(coastal flooding projections subject to multiple uncertainties).
46
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (2015), https://perma.cc/N2NRS79A.
47
See, e.g. U.S. Federal Highway Administration, The Gulf Coast Study, Phase 2: Assessing Transportation System
Vulnerability to Climate Change: Synthesis of Lessons Learned and Methods Applied (Oct. 2014),
https://perma.cc/N3R9-DEFN.
48

Minnesota Department of Health, Extreme Heat Toolkit, Appendix H, H-5 & H-8 (June 2012),
https://perma.cc/XM4X-2AQE.
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relative temperature levels as well as factors correlated positively or negatively with
vulnerability (e.g., density of residents receiving public housing assistance and density of tree
cover) makes it possible to derive and map a Heat Vulnerability Index for a given jurisdiction.
(See figure _.)
Figure _. Heat Vulnerability Index for New York City.49

Another factor for possible inclusion in urban heat vulnerability maps is the presence of
ventilation corridors—channels through a cityscape that, if present, can allow the wind’s passage
to diminish ambient heat.50
Like the maps shown above, maps depicting flood-related vulnerabilities compile data on
the hazard (i.e., water levels and wave action under different scenarios) and on the area’s
relevant features, including topography, toxics storage sites, and infrastructure such as bridges or
electric grid substations. San Mateo County, California’s SLR Vulnerability Assessment, for
instance, includes “Asset Exposure Maps” that overlay the areas subject to flooding under
different SLR scenarios with key components of the built environment.51 (See figure _.)

49

Jaime Madrigano et al., A Case-Only Study of Vulnerability to Heat Wave–Related Mortality in New York City
(2000–2011), 123 Environmental Health Perspecitves 672, 675 fig.1 (July 2015), https://perma.cc/8D9A-LNT7
(“NYC census tracts according to composite heat vulnerability index. The index is composed of z-scores of the
following variables: (+) proportion of homes receiving public assistance, (+) proportion of non-Hispanic black
residents, (+) proportion of overall deaths occurring in the home, (+) relative surface temperature, (–) proportion of
trees. A higher composite index score indicates a residential area with a higher risk of heat-related mortality.”). The
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene based its own HVI on this one. New York City, Cool
Neighborhoods NYC A Comprehensive Approach to Keep Communities Safe in Extreme Heat 9 fig.3 (2017),
https://perma.cc/A3NZ-MR8D.
50
See Hu, X. M., & M. Xue, Influence of Synoptic Sea-Breeze Fronts on the Urban Heat Island Intensity in Dallas–
Fort Worth, Texas, 144(4) Monthly Weather Review 1487-1507 (2016); M. Roth, Urban heat island, in Handbook
of Environmental Fluid Dynamics vol. 2, at 2 (2013).
51
County of San Mateo, Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessment—Draft Report, Appendix B (Apr. 2017),
https://perma.cc/3RUW-H45G (report without appendices), https://perma.cc/6ZXM-G5YW (Appendix B).
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Figure _. San Mateo County’s Built Asset Exposure Map, showing San Francisco
International Airport.52

Assets located in projected flood zones are thus readily identified as potentially vulnerable.
Specifying objectives. In some instances, it can be relatively easy to specify feasible
climate change adaptation objectives for the built environment and public health. For electricity
distribution utilities, which are under a statutory obligation to provide a minimum level of
service to a defined group of end-users, the obvious objective vis-à-vis public health is simply to
meet those obligations in spite of foreseeable climate change-driven hazards and the
vulnerabilities—for instance, substations not hardened against flooding53—arising from them.
Similarly, the basic adaptation objective of a prison might be to provide adequately for the health
and wellbeing of its inmates in spite of the effects of heat waves on indoor temperatures.54
However, for institutions with a wider array of competing duties, such as municipalities,
specifying broadly acceptable and realistic objectives can present challenges.55 Furthermore,
52

Id. at App. B-4.
The experience of Superstrorm Sandy, flooding from which led to the explosive destruction of the 13th Street
substation in lower Manhattan, led, among other things, to a thorough vulnerability assessment and plans to harden
all low-lying substations in New York City against flood risk. See Consolidated Edison, 2015 Capital Work Plan:
Storm Hardening–East 13th St 138kV & 345 kV Substation, https://perma.cc/63UV-D72S (accessed Aug. 13, 2017)
(“Based on storm hardening evaluations, this project will raise the existing perimeter flood wall to elevation 18.2’ to
provide higher storm surge protection, relocate the grade level control room to a higher elevation on the second
floor, replace the protection scheme of station equipment with new microprocessor relays and fiber optics
communication in between relays, provide capability to raise transformer control cabinets during a flood event....”).
54
See Cole v. Collier, Case 4:14-cv-01698, at 40, 67 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2017) (ordering prison to maintain indoor
temperatures below heat index of 88°F despite testimony about high costs involved in providing air conditioning
capacity adequate to the task, and citing Daniel W. E. Holt, Heat in U.S. Prisons and Jails: Corrections and the
Challenge of Climate Change, Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Aug. 2015)).
55
The Long-Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) developed by Hampton Roads following a grim vulnerability
assessment is illustrative. As the Georgetown Climate Center explains: “The LRTP concludes that climate impacts,
specifically sea-level rise, might eventually require the relocation or rebuilding of regional roadways. The LRTP
explains why it may be difficult to adopt transportation adaptation strategies due to financial constraints, and
emphasizes that policy alternatives to adapt transportation infrastructure to the impacts posed by hurricanes and
flooding are limited. The LRTP does not provide for specific, concrete measures that should be taken to safeguard
53
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where vulnerabilities are especially large relative to the capacity of the institution charged with
their address—for instance, the government of a small coastal town56—setting out ambitious
objectives can damage credibility.
Exploring options and planning. Whereas the foregoing steps do not necessarily require
public engagement, exploring options for how to achieve adaptation objectives for the built
environment and then planning how to do so means, inevitably, seeking the approval of a larger
group of stakeholders.57 Put another way, even if the previous steps are done in technocratic
fashion, deciding what measures to take, how much should be spent on them, and how to pay for
them involves weighing those measures against the competing priorities of other stakeholders or
the public as a whole. This is so chiefly because the tools available to adapt (or to push others to
adapt) the built environment take the form of laws and regulations that govern land use planning,
infrastructure design, and building design and construction. All of these are highly significant to
numerous and diverse stakeholders, and are subject to the purview of state or local government.
These tools lend themselves to “mainstreaming,” that is “integrating climate adaptation
into existing management plans (for example, hazard mitigation, ecosystem conservation, water
management, public health, risk contingency, and energy).”58 Researchers have found that
“[m]ainstreaming prevents adaptation from becoming a solely environmental issue, reduces the
risks of agenda sidelining and lowers administrative and implementation costs.”59 The alternative
to mainstreaming would be to develop adaptation plans independent of land use or infrastructure
planning processes, and then to implement those independent plans by altering the results of
infrastructure against rising sea levels.” Georgetown Climate Center, Adaptation Clearinghouse: Hampton Roads
Climate Change Adaptation Project, https://perma.cc/2R7T-X8R7 (last updated July 7, 2016); see also Hampton
Roads Transportation Planning Organization, 2034 Long Range Transportation Plan (June 2015).
56
See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Hamin et al., Barriers to Municipal Climate Adaptation: Examples From Coastal
Massachusetts’ Smaller Cities and Towns, 80 J. Am. Planning Ass’n 110-22 (Sept. 2014) (“The planners
interviewed reported that barriers to adaptation actions tend to be interconnected; for example, the strength of
private property interests often limits local political leadership on the issue. Without such leadership, it is difficult
for planners to allocate time and/or money to adaptation activities.”).
57
Several how-to adaptation guides encourage adaptation planners to consider the “STAPLEE” categories of factors
and the stakeholders concerned with each of them: social, technical, administrative, political, legal economic,
environmental. See South Florida Regional Planning Council, Adaptation Action Areas: A Planning Guidebook for
Florida’s Local Governments Regional Climate Action Framework: Implementation Guide 63 (2015),
https://perma.cc/2H39-7WUC; NOAA, Adapting to Climate Change: A Planning Guide for State Coastal Managers
52–53 (2010), https://perma.cc/E4M2-M6Y7. The STAPLEE list was first developed for the purposes of disaster
mitigation planning. See FEMA, Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Actions and Implementing Strategies
(2003), https://perma.cc/56PU-K5CS (listing STAPLEE factors in detail).
58
Rosina Bierbaum et al., Ch. 28: Adaptation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National
Climate Assessment 670-706, 682 (J. M. Melillo et al., eds. 2014); see also Ebinezer R. Florano, Mainstreaming
Integrated Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Local Development Plans in the Philippines,
in Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation 433, 435 tbl.1 (Walter Leal Filho ed. 2015) (noting numerous points of
convergency between adaptation and disaster mitigation policies and arguing for "mainstreaming" of adaptation by
unifying both policy areas).
59
Linda Shi et al., supra note 39, at 337.
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conventional planning processes. An example of mainstreaming helps to illustrate its strengths:
the Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC)’s three-year capital improvement programs
for stormwater and wastewater have, since 2015, incorporated precipitation and sea level
parameters based on not just historical weather patterns but also on projections of more severe
future precipitation and sea-level rise.60 They will thus steer design and procurement decisions in
ways that better adapt the city’s stormwater and wastewater infrastructure to a changing climate,
and will also avoid maladaptive investments that could put the city’s drinking water or
wastewater management systems—and thus public health—at risk. These three-year programs
reflect the parameters established by the climate change vulnerability assessment BWSC
conducted from 2010 to 2015 as part of its most recent 25-year capital asset plan.61
Implementing and evaluating. Though implementation can mean various things in
relation to different adaptation measures, in all cases it means the allocation of scarce resources
to realize plans intended to respond to a climate-related vulnerability. Whether for small-scale
programs like the deployment of temporary cooling centers, or larger-scale, transformational
measures like the inland relocation of a coastal community, funds must be appropriated,
decisions made, and work plans drafted and executed. Taking this step to respond to future risks
can be difficult—harder, certainly, than assessing vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, the authors of
the Adaptation chapter in the Third National Climate Assessment observed that the key barriers
to effective adaptation efforts include a “lack of resources to begin and sustain adaptation efforts;
fragmentation of decision-making; institutional constraints; lack of leadership; and divergent risk
perceptions/cultures and values.”62 In instances where the scale of planned adaptation would be
not just incremental but transformational, high absolute costs and uncertainty about costs and
benefits rise to the top of the list of barriers.63 Researchers and agencies alike advise that, to
overcome at least some of these barriers, preference should be given to adaptation measures that
are likely to yield co-benefits.64 Investment in such measures will—the reasoning goes—be
easier to justify and more likely to yield manifestly net-positive outcomes regardless of whether
their adaptation benefits ever materialize.
60

Boston Water and Sewer Commission, Capital Improvement Program 2017-2019, at 7 (Nov. 2016),
https://perma.cc/2JV3-5S3P (“Critical elements of this Plan include: . . . Assessment of the Commission’s Service
Goals and other factors affecting long-term planning including changing regulatory requirements, climate change
and financial conditions;”) (emphasis added).
61
See Charlie Jewell et al., BWSC Climate Change Risk Assessment, Findings and Mitigation/Adaptation Strategies
for Wastewater and Strom Drainage--NEWAE Conference Presentation (Jan. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/384GR8WC.
62
Bierbaum et al., Ch. 28 in NCA 3, at 683–86.
63
Id.; see also CITES RE BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION, ESPECIALLY TO IMPLEMENTATION.
64
William H. Butler et al., Low-Regrets Incrementalism: Land Use Planning Adaptation to Accelerating Sea Level
Rise in Florida’s Coastal Communities, 36 Journal of Planning Education and Research 319-332 (May 2016),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X16647161 (describing examples of adaptation plans that seek to support cobenefits); June J. Cheng & Peter Berry, Health co-benefits and risks of public health adaptation strategies to climate
change: a review of current literature, April 2013, Volume 58, Issue 2, pp 305–311.
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Evaluation is no mere procedural formality: because the future is uncertain, planners
cannot safely assume that parameters relevant to their decisions—from the rate of sea level rise
to the range and seasonality of infectious disease vectors—will be consistent with multi-decadal
projections. Thus, because effective adaptation efforts are necessarily “dynamic iterative learning
processes,”65 they should assume that more information about climate-driven hazards and
vulnerabilities will be revealed over time, and that preliminary decisions should be evaluated as
new information corrects earlier assumptions—whether about the environment or the measure’s
design.66 Notably, however, while this “adaptive management” approach is widely considered a
best practice,67 “[t]here is little literature evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation actions,” and
most efforts at evaluation “to date, have focused on the creation of process-based rather than
outcome-based indicators.”68 Evaluations of hazard mitigation efforts not expressly oriented to
climate change are more numerous and can serve as models for evaluating adaptation efforts,
which often involve similar measures and goals.69
2. Substance
Hundreds of cities and smaller localities have engaged in some version of the process
described above,70 in some instances on their own initiative and in others steered or supported by
state and/or federal law or policy.71 Many of the resulting adaptation measures have been
demonstrated to reduce vulnerability to climate change-driven impacts.72 Some do so by
reducing exposure to hazards, for instance by retreating from a coastline or elevating coastal
65

Mimura & Roger S. Pulwarty, et al., supra note __, at 871.
See Sierra C. Woodruff, Planning for an unknowable future: uncertainty in climate change adaptation planning,
139 Climatic Change 445-459 (Dec. 2016), doi:10.1007/s10584-016-1822-y.
67
See, e.g., Elisabeth Hamin and Nicole Gurran, Climbing the Adaptation Planning Ladder: Barriers and Enablers in
Municipal Planning, in Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation 839, 843–44 (Walter Leal Filho ed. 2015); Kristi
L. Ebi, Overview: Adaptive Management for the Health Risks of Climate Change, in Climate Change Adaptation in
Developed Nations 121–31 (James D. Ford & Lea Berrang-Ford eds. 2011).
68
Bierbaum et al., NCA3 at 682.
69
See, e.g. FEMA, Reducing Losses through Higher Regulatory Standards: Best Practices and Cost-Effective
Strategies Report (2015), https://perma.cc/HT6S-5VJJ.
66

70

Two of the leading organizations devised to facilitate and coordinate cities’ adaptation (and mitigation) efforts are
ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability and the Compact of Mayors. See ICLEI-Local Governments for
Sustainability USA, Our Members, https://perma.cc/2D3V-L9DU (accessed Aug. 15, 2017) (listing 191 member
localities and noting that ICLEI’s international membership includes over 1000 localities in 86 countries); Compact
of Mayors, Cities Committed to the Compact of Mayors, (accessed Aug. 15, 2017) (indicating 142 members located
in the U.S. and 668 in total committed to a program of self-reported goals, vulnerabilities, plans, and actions taken).
71
For examples of state laws that have prompted and guided local adaptation planning, see, e.g., CRRA (NY); Peril
of Flood (Fla). But see also Thomas Ruppert & Alexander Stewart, Summary and Commentary on Sea Level Rise
Adaptation Language in Florida Local Government Comprehensive Plans and Ordinances 4 (July 2015),
http://perma.cc/7VU6-ZGF4 (noting that most ordinances’ language is not self-executing and that this “may result in
situations in which comprehensive plan language appears more proactive than the tangible actions of a local
government in day-to-day operations.”).
72
H. Anderson et al., CDC, Climate and Health Intervention Assessment: Evidence on Public Health Interventions
to Prevent the Negative Health Effects of Climate Change (2017), https://perma.cc/P88P-E62E.
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structures above the level of floodwaters expected during the structures’ life. Others do so by
reducing the hazards themselves, for instance by installing large amounts of urban green
infrastructure to mitigate the urban heat island effect. And still others do so by increasing
resilience, for instance by enlarging the capacity of stormwater management systems in
anticipation of downpours that would otherwise leave streets temporarily flooded.
To explore these points with respect to the built environment, this subpart returns to the
hazards described in part I.A. above and considers examples of adaptation measures—ranging
from the immediate to the long-term, the local to the regional, and the incremental to the
transformational—that are responsive to them.
1. Heat, especially in cities
Adaptive responses to heat range widely and are not reducible to as unified and
straightforward a framework as adaptations to coastal flooding. As described below, they cover
the full ranges of geographic scope, timeframe, degree of change, and other dimensions of
adaptation measures listed in part I.A of this chapter.
Measures taken to cope directly with individuals’ vulnerability over short time frames
include: providing warnings on hot days, establishing and publicizing the presence of temporary
cooling centers where vulnerable populations live or work, and creating community support
networks like the “Be A Buddy” component of New York City’s Cool Neighborhoods initiative,
which links community organizations with vulnerable individuals and facilitates phone or inperson check-ins on hot days.73 These measures generally do not alter the built environment, but
instead identify and correct for instances where permanent features of the built environment fail
to reduce a sensitive population’s exposure to the hazard of heat—or exacerbate that exposure.74
Other measures reduce individuals’ vulnerability indirectly by making changes to design
specifications and maintenance protocols for electricity infrastructure and transit networks.75
These changes generally modify the composition and operation of elements of the built
environment—a bit like a house that remains adjacent to the shore but is raised on stilts in
anticipation of flooding. They can also, however, be more transformative, for instance by
relocating system components or reformulating the system’s physical and operational features to
support different capabilities, like the “islanding” of segments of an electricity distribution grid

73

Cool Neighborhoods at 23–25.
See notes __-__, above, and accompanying text, which discusses programs in Minnesota and New York City.
75
U.S. Department of Energy, Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate Change Resilience
Planning 84 (Sept. 2016), https://perma.cc/63KM-R9GK (listing measures recommended by AVANGRID to
improve resilience to heat waves); North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, Climate Change Risk
Assessment of New Jersey’s Transportation Infrastructure 87 (2011) (listing heat ratings for rail system components
and indicating risks of exceedance).
74
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when transmission lines are inoperable. The geographic scope of these changes generally reflects
the jurisdiction of the regulatory authority requiring and/or authorizing them.76
Finally, some measures seek to reduce the hazard itself by changing the materials and
morphology of a cityscape. These include increasing the albedo of roofs, pavements, and walls;77
replacing impervious surfaces with green infrastructure to increase both albedo and (under some
circumstances) cooling action through evapotranspiration;78 and preserving or creating wind
corridors.79 “Cool roof” programs are quick, low-cost examples of such measures that alter
almost nothing about the built environment but achieve measurable temperature reductions on
surfaces and within buildings covered by those surfaces.80 Replacing impervious surfaces with
green infrastructure, such as rain gardens and extensive (shallow) or intensive (deep) green roofs,
is more involved than cool roofing and has a more complicated relationship to adaptation to the
heat hazard. To begin, while some tree canopies clearly reduce air temperatures in their vicinity
by raising albedo and performing evapotranspiration, small patches of greenery are less certain to
do so,81 which means that a city seeking to abate its urban heat island cannot expect success to
follow from merely accumulating fragmented and disparate patches of low-cost green
infrastructure. Furthermore, while green infrastructure has several justifications linked to public
health, because its primary justification is often stormwater management, its design and
placement tends to be oriented to detaining stormwater rather than cooling the ambient air. As
for the preservation or creation of urban wind corridors, this is an especially clear example of
transforming a cityscape on a permanent basis for the sake of adaptation to heat hazards.
2. Coastal flooding

76

See, e.g., Emerald Coast Utilities Authority, Wastewater Services, https://perma.cc/AD8D-VGWN (accessed Oct.
12, 2017) (describing relocation and redesign of water reclamation facility from near coastal flood zone to higher
ground in Escambia County, Florida, following Hurricane Ivan).
77
See, e.g., Haley Gilbert et al., Keeping California cool: Recent cool community developments, 114 Energy and
Buildings 20–26 (Feb. 2016) (describing school districts’ and cities’ cool pavements and cool roofs pilot programs
and preliminary outcomes).
78
Kieron Doick & Tony Hutchings, UK Forestry Commission, Research Note: Air Temperature Regulation by
Urban Trees and Green Infrastructure 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/7T93-WQBC (describing mechanisms of cooling,
including evaporative cooling and evapostranspiration).
79
See Leyre Echevarr a Icaza & Franklin van der Hoeven, Regionalist Principles to Reduce the Urban Heat Island
Effect, 9 Sustainability 677, 679 (2017) (listing “creation of cool wind corridors” among measures used to mitigate
UHI effect); Hu, X. M., & M. Xue, Influence of Synoptic Sea-Breeze Fronts on the Urban Heat Island Intensity in
Dallas–Fort Worth, Texas, 144(4) Monthly Weather Review 1487–1507 (2016).
80
Kevin Krajick, New York Roofs: Brighter, Whiter, Cooler, Earth Institute: State of the Planet (Mar. 7, 2012),
(quoting physicist Stuart Gaffin regarding the use of white acrylic paint for cool roofing: “It’s the lowest hanging
fruit. It’s very cheap to do; it’s a retro-fit. You don’t need a skilled labor force. And you don’t have to wait for a roof
to be retired.”); see also Stuart R. Gaffin et al., Bright is the new black: multi-year performance of high-albedo roofs
in an urban climate, 7 Environmental Research Letters 014029 (2012).
81
Kieron Doick & Tony Hutchings, UK Forestry Commission, Research Note: Air Temperature Regulation by
Urban Trees and Green Infrastructure 4 (2013), https://perma.cc/7T93-WQBC (describing scalar factors important
to effectiveness of greenery for cooling).
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Adaptive responses to encroaching seas and more intense coastal storms take one (or a
combination) of three forms: protection, accommodation, or retreat.82 Protection means
interposing barriers—whether “hard armoring,” such as sea walls, or “soft armoring,” such as
living shorelines83—between rising seas and landward assets and people with the goal of
preserving existing patterns of development and activity. Accommodation means staying in the
same place—“living with water”84—but changing local land uses and building and infrastructure
design in ways that reduce vulnerability and improve resiliency to flooding. Concretely, this
could include compelling real estate sellers to disclose vulnerability to flooding, elevating
mechanical or electrical components within buildings, elevating whole structures, or up-rating
machinery to endure inundation by saltwater.85 Partial or full retreat, which involves abandoning
land and assets made vulnerable by rising seas, is only simple conceptually; its planning and
implementation are legally and politically complex.86 Consider Miami Beach, where seawalls
cannot prevent saltwater from flooding city streets by infiltrating via the porous bedrock.87
Though retreat—managed or otherwise—appears inevitable, the City Engineer recently
remarked: “When somebody says, ‘How much are you willing to fall back?’ I say, ‘Not one
inch.’ We are defending this city at the shoreline. Miami Beach is only one mile wide. If we drop
back a mile, we don’t have a city.”88
82

John R. Nolon, Protecting the Environment Through Land Use Law: Standing Ground 221 (2014).
Robert Verchick & Joel Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change: United
States and International Aspects 18–19 (Michael B. Gerard and Katrina Kuh, eds., 2012). Hard armoring tends to
create expensive problems over time; soft armoring is generally favored by scientists, planners, and civil engineers,
but is usually feasible only where development (i.e., asphalt, concrete foundations, structures, and infrastructure) can
be displaced or has not encroached too close to the water’s edge. Gary B. Griggs, The Effects of Armoring
Shorelines—The California Experience, in Puget Sound Shorelines and the Impacts of Armoring—Proceedings of a
State of the Science Workshop, May 2009 (Hugh Shipman et al., eds. 2010), https://perma.cc/FN54-7425.
84
Working together with water: A living land builds for its future—Findings of the Deltacommissie 2008, at 61
(2008), https://perma.cc/9TJH-A7Y2 (describing the Dutch Leven met Water research program).
85
See, e.g., City of New York Department of City Planning, Coastal Climate Resilience: Designing for Flood Risk
16–17 (June 2013), https://perma.cc/7VWS-BLFL.
86
See C. Kousky, Managing shoreline retreat: a US perspective, 124 Climatic Change 9, 9 (2014),
https://perma.cc/5MY2-NVP3 (discussing institutional factors that impede managed retreat by whole communities
in the U.S.). The Quinault Tribe of Washington State is an exception that proves the rule. Their cohesive and
homogeneous community will not repair the seawall that is currently losing its battle to protect Taholah village from
a rising Pacific Ocean. Instead, the tribe, using federal funds, will move the 700-person village to higher ground at a
cost of about $350,000 per person. NOAA, U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, Case Studies: Quinault Indian Nation
Plans for Village Relocation, https://perma.cc/3PC4-79B3 (last updated Dec. 2, 2016); see also Quinault Indian
Nation, Taholah Village Relocation Master Plan, https://perma.cc/3LA8-63UZ (updated May 16, 2017).
87
Stan Cox & Paul Cox, A Rising Tide: Miami is sinking beneath the sea—but not without a fight, The New
Republic, Nov. 8, 2015, http://bit.ly/21pwWBD. The city is planning to spend several hundred million dollars on a
system of elevated streets and electrically powered pumps, but even these efforts at accommodation struggle to
contain and expel seawater faster than it flows in. Joey Flechas et al., Emily rain pounds South Florida and Beach
pumps fail without power, Miami Herald, Aug. 1, 2017, https://perma.cc/25YH-JNYX.
83

88

Pam Radtke Russel, Special Report: How Engineers Are Preparing for Sea-Level Rise: From Seattle to Cape
Cod, see what's being done at 18 different locations, Engineering News Record, Aug. 11, 2017,
https://perma.cc/7JXL-X3VU.
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Each of these approaches can take smaller-scale “incremental” forms that aim to cope with
hazards, or larger “transformational” forms that aim to greatly reduce or even eliminate
vulnerabilities. Protection: in contrast to a modest seawall or living shoreline seaward of one
parcel of property, the State of Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan envisions wetland and
barrier island restorations on a scale large enough to stem—and ideally offset—the rapid
subsidence and erosion of the state’s entire coastline.89 Accommodation: like the elevation of a
beach house, only on the scale of citywide infrastructure, Miami Beach has raised many of its
streets and sidewalks by several feet, such that floodwaters inundate them less severely and less
often.90 Retreat: this approach is inherently transformational, but it can be undertaken in a
disorganized fashion, as happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,91 or in coordinated
fashion, as has happened with state support and guidance on Staten Island and with federal
support in Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana and Taholah Village, Washington.92
Among the policy tools used to effectuate these categories of coastal adaptation are:
Land use rules and restrictions
• Conditional development;
• Conservation easements;
• Floodplain regulations;
• Hard- and soft-armoring permits;
• Land Trusts;
• Real estate disclosures;
• Rebuilding restrictions;
• Setbacks and buffers;
• Transferable development rights;
• Zoning and overlay zones.

Design prescriptions
• Building codes;
• Infrastructure design parameters.
Fees and financing
• Coastal land acquisition programs;
• Flood insurance requirements;
• Impact fees;
• Level of service downgrades;
• Special assessments;
• Stormwater utility.

Each of these is described in greater depth elsewhere.93 For this chapter’s purposes, the key point
to take from the list is that the tools for adapting to coastal flooding are the same as conventional
89

Id. at 94–95, 100–102.
Joey Flechas, Miami Beach to begin new $100 million flood prevention project in face of sea level rise, Miami
Herald, Jan. 28, 2017, https://perma.cc/H9FB-LLG6.
91
Elizabeth Maly et al., Experience from the United States: Post-Katrina and Sandy, in Land Use Management in
Disaster Risk Reduction 79, __ (Dec. 2016).
92
Id. at __; State of Louisiana, Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Project, https://perma.cc/EG6T-VLVB (accessed
Oct. 12, 2017); U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, Quinault Indian Nation Plans for Village Relocation,
https://perma.cc/V58H-TP33 (last modified Jan. 17, 2017).
93
See, e.g., South Florida Regional Planning Council, Adaptation Action Areas: A Planning Guidebook for
Florida’s Local Governments Regional Climate Action Framework: Implementation Guide 63 (2015),
https://perma.cc/2H39-7WUC; Anne Siders, Managed Coastal Retreat: A Legal Handbook on Shifting Development
Away from Vulnerable Areas (Oct. 2013), https://perma.cc/Z5A2-ALQB (providing illustrative examples). For an
example of how an ordinance can introduce downgrades to the level of service for a branch of networked
infrastructure, see Thomas Ruppert et al., Environmentally Compromised Road Segments—A Model Ordinance, at
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planning in coastal communities. Importantly, public health seldom factors directly into the use
of these tools, which draw instead on inputs relating to land values, engineering specifications,
and aesthetic preferences.
II. Legal Issues
The preceding section discusses policies and measures responsive to particular climatedriven impacts, but leaves discussion of legal requirements and constraints that those responses
are sure to encounter for this section. This section’s discussion is not comprehensive with respect
to legal issues arising from efforts to adapt—it does not, for instance, discuss disputes among
private actors, nor conflicts and entanglements arising from government-led adaptation efforts’
intersecting with legal obligations imposed by federal laws, such as the Clean Water Act’s
requirements for stormwater management. Instead, it focuses on situations in which state or local
governments run the risk of litigation brought by private actors. One such situation arises when
governments’ efforts to reduce adverse public health impacts by adapting land uses and the built
environment to climate change cause some individuals to arguably be harmed economically by
decreased property values or limitations on the use of their property. In such cases, people may
attempt to sue the regulating entity to compensate them for their loss, or else to try to stop the
project altogether. Another situation arises when a lack of action by governments to adapt to
climate change impacts arguably causes injuries or property damage that could have been
prevented by improved infrastructure or other measures. Thus governments can expose
themselves to legal risk whether they take a passive or active role in adapting the built
environment to climate change.
This section explores two types of claims litigants may bring against governments either for
adapting to climate change or for failing to do so. First, it considers a “takings” claim, also
known as an inverse condemnation claim, which may be brought by a property owner against a
government where the government’s actions diminish the property’s value. Such claims can be
expected when governments make decisions related to coastal infrastructure or land use in
particular.94 Next, it considers a negligence claim, which alleges that an entity or individual’s
actions fell below a reasonable standard of care, and therefore harmed the individual bringing the
lawsuit. These are not the only legal theories that could be brought by parties seeking to
challenge action or inaction related to climate change or its impacts, but they are among the most
readily available to parties vying with government defendants. They thus provide a useful
illustration of the legal risks governments face and the limits to redress available to plaintiffs in
the context of a changing climate.

para. 1, https://perma.cc/3RLM-DY7K (accessed Jan. 6, 2017) (“any road categorized as ‘environmentally
compromised’ under this ordinance shall be the subject of a requested design/maintenance exception.”).
94
See, e.g., Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835 (2011).

20

CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (forthcoming)
Chapter 6: The Built Environment | Justin Gundlach & Jennifer Klein

A. Takings Claims
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “private property [may not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 95 The
Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition to states and municipalities.96 Many state
constitutions also contain a takings clause closely mirroring the federal clause97 or providing
broader protections by prohibiting the government from merely damaging private property
without compensation.98
In the most clear-cut cases, a private property owner may sue the government for
physically occupying his property or for completely depriving him of the economically
beneficial use of his property.99 Such cases are known as per se takings and, if proven, require
the government to pay the owner “just compensation” for the deprivation.
In contrast, governments often institute regulations that decrease the range of uses
available to a property owner, and possibly decrease property values, but do not completely
deprive the owner of the use of his property. For example, in response to encroaching sea levels,
a local government might impose a setback requirement, such that property owners cannot build
on the portions of their plot closest to the shore. If an owner sued the local government for
imposing the setback requirement,100 his “regulatory takings” challenge would be governed by
the multi-factor test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.101 The
Penn Central test requires courts to inquire as to 1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, 2) the character of the governmental action, and 3) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with the economic expectations of the property owner.102 In other
words, courts determining the merit of a regulatory takings claim must balance the interests of
the parties, with a focus on the magnitude and character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights.
1. Claims against governments in response to adaptation plans and policies
95

U.S. Const. amend. V.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
97
See, e.g., Conn. Const. art. I, § 11 (“The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just
compensation therefor”); Wis. Const. art. I, § 13 (same).
98
See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. I, § 18 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.”); Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17 (“No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having first been made…”); Ark. Const. art. II, § 22 (“…private property shall not be
taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor.”)
96

99

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
100

See, e.g., A Piece of Paradise v. Borough of Fenwick Zoning Board of Appeals. No. LNDCV136047679S, 2015
WL 10285888 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015)
101
102

438 U.S. 104 (1978)
Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 212 (1986) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
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Several cases demonstrate the challenges that property owners face when bringing
takings claims in response to climate change adaptation policies adopted by the federal or local
government. In one such case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected a takings claim
brought by a property owner who had been prohibited from developing since its land was located
within a floodplain.103 This prohibition is an example of an adaptation measure designed to
reduce exposure to hazards by decreasing the amount of development within an area likely to
experience flooding. The developer, Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased more than 4,000 acres
of land along a riverbank. At the time of purchase, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was in the process of designating most of the area a regulatory floodway. The South
Carolina county in which Columbia Venture’s property was located adopted the FEMA maps,
and, through an existing local ordinance, restricted construction in the floodway. The County’s
land-use standards were more restrictive than those required by the federal government in
recognition of FEMA’s failure to project the likelihood of increased flooding due to climate
change.104
A Special Referee was appointed to consider Columbia Venture’s regulatory taking
claim. Applying the Penn Central factors, the Special Referee concluded that FEMA’s
designation of Columbia Venture’s property as a regulatory floodway caused a significant
decrease in the property’s value.105 This factor was outweighed, however, by the fact that
Columbia Venture’s expectation of being able to develop the property was unreasonable in light
of the foreseeable potential regulatory bar on floodplain development. Moreover, the county’s
floodplain regulations served an important purpose — flood protection.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Special Referee’s decision that the
county’s floodway development restrictions did not constitute a taking. With respect to
Columbia Venture’s investment-backed expectations, the court held that the developer faced an
“uncertain path forward” in light of the pending FEMA flood maps and associated county
regulations. The county was a long-time participant in federal flood planning programs, and the
developer was a sophisticated party with notice of the county’s floodplain development
restrictions, as well as the pendency of FEMA’s revised floodway designation. The planned
development was, therefore “purely speculative in nature,” and the developer’s expectation of
being able to successfully pursue the development was unreasonable. The Supreme Court also
acknowledged “the important public purposes of mitigating the social and economic costs of
flooding [] served by the County’s ordinances.”106 Thus, the County was not responsible for
103

Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland Cty., 413 S.C. 423, 431, 776 S.E.2d 900, 904 (2015), reh’g denied (Oct. 9,
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1458 (2016).
104
Id. at 431, n.4.
105
Id. at 441.
106
Id. at 452.
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paying the developer “just compensation,” despite the impact of its floodplain regulations on the
value of the property.107
As the court recognized in Columbia Venture, there is no “magic formula” for applying
the Penn Central factors in determining whether a government regulation causing interference
with property is a taking.108 In light of the “nearly infinite variety of ways in which government
actions or regulations can affect property interests,” climate change adaptation policies’
vulnerability to a takings claim will depend on the circumstances of the particular landowner’s
case. One conclusion that can be gleaned from Columbia Venture, however, is that governments
choosing to pursue climate change adaptation policies should do so as soon as possible. As a
report prepared by the University of Maine’s Marine Law Institute observed in the context of a
coastal retreat policy proposal, “[t]he earlier that the public is on notice of the…policy choice…,
the more likely the regulations are to withstand legal challenge. Property that is purchased after
the regulations are adopted will be bought subject to the expectations that the development
restrictions will be applied….”109
2. Claims against governments for failure to adapt the built environment
Property owners may also initiate litigation against the government for taking private
property where the government fails to prevent the impacts of climate change, thereby indirectly
causing damage to the owner’s property.110
For example: Starting in the 1950s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the
Corps) built the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a 76-mile channel between New
Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico intended to provide a shorter shipping route. 111 Although
MRGO was designed to be 500 feet wide, decades of use eroded the channel to more than triple
its design width.112 MRGO’s increased width allowed the channel to carry a much greater
107

A Connecticut court reached a similar result in A Piece of Paradise v. Borough of Fenwick Zoning Board of
Appeals. No. LNDCV136047679S, 2015 WL 10285888 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015). In that case, the plaintiff
owned a parcel of land on which it planned to build a single family home. The lot was located within a coastal
boundary, which required the municipality to undertake a coastal site plan review. The lot owner applied for a
variance from a fifty-foot setback requirement imposed by the local government, and the board denied the plaintiff’s
variance request. Id. at *4 The court held that the board’s denial did not constitute a taking without just
compensation. Id. at *8.
108

Columbia Venture at 448.
U.S. EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, & Evaluation, Anticipatory Planning For Seal-Level Rise Along the Coast
of Maine (1995).
110
For an extremely informative discussion of government liability under the Takings Clause for failure to act to
protect private property, see Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (2014).
111
Michael Gerrard, Hurricane Katrina Decision Highlights Liability for Decaying Infrastructure, New York Law
Journal (May 10, 2012).
112
Id.
109
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volume of water, exposed a greater surface area to wind causing more severe waves, and carried
saltwater inland, destroying buffer wetlands. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005,
several levees and storm walls surrounding MRGO were destroyed, and the city was devastated
by the resultant flooding.113
In the aftermath of the hurricane, hundreds of plaintiffs sued the United States
government to recover damages for flooded property. Although a series of cases brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) were unsuccessful because the government was found to be
immune from suit,114 a more recent decision in a case brought under the Takings Clause found in
favor of the property owners.
In Saint Bernard Parish Government v. United States,115 Judge Susan Braden of the
United States Court of Federal Claims found that the Corps’ negligent design and failure to
maintain MRGO exacerbated flood damage in parts of New Orleans. The increased flooding,
although temporary, wrongfully deprived landowners of the use of their property requiring
compensation. Judge Braden’s decision relied heavily on a 2012 Supreme Court case, Arkansas
Game and Fish Commission v. United States, which held that temporary flooding caused by
government action is not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability. 116 The plaintiffs in
Saint Bernard Parish avoided the sovereign immunity issues that prevented the FTCA litigants
from recovering damages, because the United States has waived sovereign immunity for claims
brought under the Takings Clause through the Tucker Act.117
That the government was held liable for inadequately preparing federally-constructed and
maintained infrastructure for severe weather events in Saint Bernard Parish is significant in light
of the increasing risk of such events due to climate change. Notably, Saint Bernard Parish, if it
survives appeal, expands government liability from situations in which the government
deliberately causes flooding, for example by releasing water from a dam, to include situations in
which inaction by the government exacerbates flooding from severe weather through its failure

113

Id.
In those cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at first affirmed the trial court’s finding of liability, but then
issued a subsequent ruling finding that the government was immune from the plaintiffs’ claims, because its actions
in connection with the design and maintenance of MR-GO were largely discretionary. In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding the federal government liable for Hurricane Katrina flood damage
caused by the Corps’ failure to armor the banks of MRGO); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436
(5th Cir. 2012) (reversing the Circuit Court’s prior decision and finding the federal government immune from suit
under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA).
115
St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015). The case has been appealed to the Federal
Circuit Court for Federal Claims. Notice of Docketing, St. Bernard Parish v. US, Case 16-2301 (Fed. Cir. July 6,
2016). As of August 2017, that proceeding is ongoing.
116
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012).
117
28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (2012) (granting jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims for claims for “damages in cases
not sounding in tort”).
114
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to properly design or maintain federally owned infrastructure.118 Professor Christopher Serkin
has argued that the Takings Clause can serve as a basis for affirmative governmental obligations
to protect private property more generally and cites sea level rise as “an ideal illustration” of an
environmental shift that could require governments to act.119 While governments obviously do
not have an obligation to protect all property from all intrusions, a duty arises where the state
exercises regulatory control over the injury-causing condition or where the state is complicit in
creating the conditions responsible for harm to the property. 120 This developing area of law will
have broad implications for state governments seeking to prepare for – or deliberately deciding
not to prepare for – climate change impacts.
Some legal scholars have expressed concern that Saint Bernard Parish and Arkansas
Game and Fish Commission allow the takings doctrine to improperly invade the traditional
domain of tort law.121 The apparent expansion of takings liability ushered in by these cases,
however, will likely be tempered by the fact specific analysis required in cases asserting claims
for temporary takings due to flooding or other natural disasters. As Judge Braden explained, a
plaintiff asserting a claim for a temporary taking must establish: (1) a protectable property
interest under state law; (2) the character of the property and the owners’ “reasonable-investment
backed expectations”; (3) foreseeability; (4) causation; and (5) substantiality.
The first prong merely requires the plaintiff to show that he has an ownership interest in
the property allegedly taken through government inaction.122 With respect to the owners’
reasonable investment backed expectations, as discussed in the previous section, courts inquire
whether the plaintiff was aware of the risks facing his property. In Saint Bernard Parish, the
court concluded that “although Plaintiffs’ properties were in a floodplain and ‘had experienced
flooding in the past,’ that flooding was not ‘comparable’ to the flooding during Hurricane
Katrina and subsequent hurricanes and severe storms giving rise to the temporary takings claim
118

Notably, Saint Bernard Parish is not the first case to support the idea that a government can commit a taking
through the failure to act. An earlier case in Florida state court held that “government inaction – in the face of an
affirmative duty to act – can support a claim for inverse condemnation.” Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); but see Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. 2016), reh'g
denied (Oct. 21, 2016) (rejecting landowners’ takings claim where the defendant county allegedly caused their
homes to flood by failing to fully implement a stormwater management plan and by approving private development
upstream).
119

Serkin, supra note __, at 388.
Id., at 377–78 (noting that “if the government…were responsible for global warming then the duty to act would
be stronger still); see also City of St. Petersburg, supra note 46, at 1086 (once a governmental entity creates a known
dangerous condition which may not be readily apparent to one who could be injured by the condition…the
governmental entity must take steps to avert the danger or warn [of] that danger); Teall v. City of Cudahy, 386 P.2d
493 (Cal. 1963) (defendant city may be held liable if it created a dangerous or defective condition); Delarosa v.
State, 21 Ariz. App. 263, 265, 518 P.2d 582, 584 (1974) (state not entitled to notice of a dangerous condition that it
has created or caused to be created).
121
John Echeverria, Takings Litigation: A blog about takings law, Ruling in MR-GO Takings Lawsuit, May 1, 2015,
https://perma.cc/U9ZM-NKP9.
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See St. Bernard Parish, supra note __, at 719.
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at issue.”123 Professor Serkin has posited that “an ‘ecological change’ can interfere with owners’
expectations just as much as an explicit legal transition.”124 As climate change causes
increasingly severe natural disasters, more courts could find that a property owner’s past
experience with severe weather does not adequately put him on notice of future risk.
The foreseeability prong of a temporary takings claim invites an inquiry into “the degree
to which the [government’s] invasion is … the foreseeable result of government action.”125 In
Saint Bernard Parish, the court found that it was foreseeable that MRGO would intensify
flooding in New Orleans based on a variety of environmental factors, including increased erosion
on MRGO’s banks and increased storm surge.126 The plaintiffs were also able to establish a
causal connection between the Corps’ failure to maintain MRGO and flooding during Hurricane
Katrina, since the Corps’ inaction was the cause of the erosion, increased storm surge, and other
exacerbating factors.127 As discussed in the previous section, developing adaptation measures
requires that governments assess vulnerabilities. As governments compile data and develop
models projecting future vulnerabilities, potential impacts due to government action or inaction
may become increasingly foreseeable.
Finally, a plaintiff alleging a temporary taking must show a sufficiently severe economic
impact on his property to constitute a legally cognizable interference. 128 Moreover, the plaintiff
must establish that the government’s inaction caused the diminished property value; in other
words, the government must have had the ability to protect the property at issue.129 In Saint
Bernard Parish, the Plaintiffs established this element by showing that their properties were
flooded because of the Corps’ negligent maintenance of MRGO and that they lost their ability to
access or use their properties for a “significant” time period – ranging from a few weeks to a few
months – following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.130
In December 2016, the Corps appealed Judge Braden’s ruling, arguing that the plaintiffs’
case “would at most establish a potential tort claim, not a Fifth Amendment taking.”131 The
Corps contends that flooding from Hurricane Katrina did not constitute a taking, because the
government did not intend to flood plaintiffs’ properties. Instead, according to the Corps, the
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Id., at 720 (citing Arkansas Game & Fish, supra note __, at 522).
Serkin, supra note __, at 352.
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St. Bernard Parish, supra note 126, at 720 (citing Arkansas Game & Fish, supra note 127, at 522).
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Id., at 721–22.
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Id., at 724–36.
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Id., at 745 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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Serkin, supra note 45, at 382–83, 395 (noting that a taking does not occur where “the action that the government
could have taken but did not would have been within the range of appropriate governmental actions” or where the
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St. Bernard Parish, supra note 126, at 746.
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Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Army Corps Asks Fed. Circ. To Undo Katrina Liability Ruling, Law 360, Dec. 12, 2016,
https://perma.cc/99X4-XPAT.
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flooding was “the sort of ‘incidental or consequential injury’ that has never been regarded as a
taking.”132
Until the Corps’ appeal is finally decided – and there is a good likelihood the case will go
to the Supreme Court – there is reason to believe that the argument for using the Takings Clause
to impose an affirmative duty to protect private property, at least in cases where the
government’s past actions create vulnerabilities to natural disaster risk, is emerging. Such cases
could promote climate change adaptation by encouraging governments to weigh the costs and
benefits of both action and inaction in the face of the increasing risk of natural disasters.
B. Negligence claims
On April 18, 2013, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn declared a state of emergency after heavy
rain caused extensive flooding in Chicago and the surrounding area.133 Residents of some
Chicago suburbs were evacuated, and people were urged to reduce household water use to
prevent further flooding at the Chicago River.134 Tens of thousands of people lost power, a
sinkhole swallowed cars, and hundreds of flights were canceled at O’Hare airport.135
Several months later, a group of insurance companies sued Chicago and over 100 nearby
local governments in a series of class action lawsuits, claiming that the municipalities did not do
enough to prevent the flooding.136 The insurance companies argued that the local governments
were negligent in failing to prepare for the impacts of climate change and sought to be
reimbursed for claims paid to property owners.137 The cases were quickly withdrawn,138 but
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Chicago Flooding: Heavy Rain Storm Prompts Emergency, Road Closures in Cook County, HUFFINGTON POST
CHICAGO (Apr. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/N2MQ-L8A2.
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Id.
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Id.; Staff Report, Storms Cause Damage, Power Outages, NBC Chicago (June 13, 2013), available at
http://www.nbcchicago.com/weather/stories/Storms-Chicago-Severe-Weather-211009451.html.
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Illinois Farmers Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, No. 14CH-06608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); Robert McCoppin, Insurance company drops suits over Chicago-area flooding,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 3, 2014) http://trib.in/2sPL9LY.
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Illinois Farmers Insurance, supra note __; Illinois Farmers Insurance Company v. County of DuPage, No. 14-L385 (Ill. Cir. Ct. DuPage Co.); Illinois Farmers Insurance Company v. County of Lake, No. 14-L-281 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Lake Co.); Illinois Farmers Insurance Company v. County of Will, No. 14-L-314 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Will Co.). The
plaintiffs’ negligence claims were brought under an Illinois statute codifying the government’s potential civil
liability. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the local government defendants violated: 1) 745 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 10/3-102, which provides that “a local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its
property in a reasonably safe condition…” and 2) 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/3-103, which provides that a local
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similar suits have been brought in Illinois139 and Australia.140 If litigated, such cases would likely
require inquiry into governments’ efforts to implement various adaptation measures, such as
requiring elevation of structures to reduce flooding or investing in green infrastructure to
decrease by-pass events by draining severe rainfall.
1. Government Immunity
State governments are generally protected from litigation by the doctrine of “sovereign
immunity.”141 Overcoming sovereign immunity presents a significant hurdle in negligence cases
in both federal and state courts by virtue of their sovereignty.142 Sovereign immunity extends
both to the government entity itself and to government officials sued in their official
capacities.143 States may consent to be sued, and many have waived sovereign immunity under

139

E.g. Tzakis v. Berger Excavating Contractors, Inc., No. 09 CH 06159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.) (class action
alleging, in part, that local governments caused flood damage to plaintiffs’ property by failing to enact new
standards reducing rainwater runoff despite the increasing risk of severe precipitation. Tzakis was ultimately
dismissed on the basis of Illinois’ Public Duty Rule, which provides that a public entity is not liable for its failure to
provide adequate “governmental services,” because the duty to provide such services is owed to the general public at
large, and not to any particular plaintiff or plaintiffs).
140

Several cases regarding the government’s duty of care to protect citizens from risk, albeit not specifically from
climate change risk, have been pursued in Australia, See, e.g., Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 C.L.R.
512 (holding that in certain circumstances the government yields a special measure of control over the safety of
citizens so as to impose a duty of care and an obligation to exercise its powers to avert a danger or to bring it to the
knowledge of citizens); Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd v. Armidale City Council (1994) 123 A.L.R. 155 (holding that if a
public authority creates or increases a risk to another person, he is obligated to take reasonable action to prevent
injury unless statute precludes the duty to act).
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Although the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit against states in federal courts does not extend to counties and
municipalities, local governments also enjoy some measure of immunity based on state statutory and common law.
Falk v. Perez, 973 F. Supp. 2d 850, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); Crouch v. City of Kansas City, 444 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (municipalities
are entitled to sovereign immunity only when engaged in governmental functions); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 478 (Fla. 2005) (state statute granted cities immunity from judgments above
certain limits); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 634, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004) (Sovereign
immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions).
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United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (doctrine is derived from the laws and practices of English ancestors);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (part of the very nature of sovereignty to be immune from unconsented suits).
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HCMF Corp. v. Gilmore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 873, 878 (W.D. Va. 1998) (Virginia's Eleventh Amendment immunity
“extends to state officials when they are merely the nominal defendants and ‘the state is the real, substantial party in
interest.’”); Illinois Health Care Ass’n v. Walters, 303 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438, 710 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999) (“If a suit is brought against a state official, yet the judgment could operate to control the actions of the state
or subject it to liability, then the suit is, in actuality, against the state.”); Olavarria v. Wake Cnty. Human Servs., 763
S.E.2d 18 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, review denied, 763 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 2014) (“governmental immunity
shields municipalities and the officers or employees thereof sued in their official capacities from suits based on torts
committed while performing a governmental function.”).
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certain circumstances through legislative enactments. Waivers are, however, interpreted
narrowly by courts.144
Nonetheless, it is sometimes possible to formulate a claim such that it falls outside the
scope of state and local governments’ immunity.145 While the nuances of sovereign immunity
vary from state to state, certain exceptions are common. First, while sovereign immunity
generally bars suits seeking monetary damages against government agencies, actions for
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief are permissible in some states.146 Second, within certain
jurisdictions, governmental immunity for tort claims is waived when the government purchases
liability insurance covering such claims.147
Many states immunize discretionary functions, but allow suit against governments and
government officials for “ministerial” actions.148 In distinguishing between discretionary acts
and ministerial functions, “the key factor is the presence of basic policy formulation, planning, or
144

New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 728 A.2d 673, 675 (Me. 1999) (we start from the premise that
immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed); Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 751
A.2d 1136, 1139 (Pa. 2000) (exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed); Guillen v. City of San Antonio, 13
S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. App. 2000) (the Texas Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of absolute common law
immunity…construed strictly on the side of preserving immunity).
145
6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:2 (“whether immunity applies is often a matter of how the claim is characterized
rather than the reality of the claim itself”).
146
Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Webster Cnty., Miss., No. 140-CV-23, 2014 WL 3437019, at *6 (N.D. Miss. July 11,
2014) (while municipalities are immune from certain claims for monetary damages, governmental immunity does
not prevent plaintiffs from seeking declaratory relief); Roland v. Epps, 10 So. 3d 972, 974 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“a
state official may be sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity”); Legal Capital, LLC. v. Med. Prof’l
Liab. Catastrophe Loss Fund, 750 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. 2000) (sovereign immunity does not apply because it is not
applicable to declaratory judgment actions); Texas Dep't of Banking v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 27 S.W.3d
276, 281 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar suit for declaratory relief); Penland v.
Redwood Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist., 956 P.2d 964, 965 (Or. 1998) (discretionary immunity does not bar a suit for
injunctive relief).
147

Napier v. Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 190 (1st Cir. 1999) (Under Maine law, if a governmental entity
procures insurance that provides coverage in areas where the governmental entity is immune under the state’s Tort
Claims Act, the entity waives its immunity, but only to the limits of the insurance coverage); City of Caddo Valley v.
George, 9 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Ariz. 2000) (“a municipal corporation's immunity for negligent acts only begins where
its insurance coverage leaves off”); Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 481 (Ga. 1994) (Georgia Tort Claims
Act waives only sovereign or governmental immunity of local governmental agency to extent of liability insurance
coverage).
148

Trotter v. Sch. Dist. 218, 733 N.E.2d 363, 375 (Ill. 2000); Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 611
N.W.2d 693, 700 (Wis. 2000) (Under the Wisconsin Tort Claims Act, a municipality is immune from any suit for
liability arising from discretionary acts); Rivera v. City of Worcester, No. 12-CV-40066, 2015 WL 685800, at *6 (D.
Mass. Feb. 18, 2015) (in Massachusetts, the discretionary function exception bars government liability for claims
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty);
Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 753 A.2d 41, 60-61 (Md. 2000) (in Maryland, government actors
generally immune from liability where tortious conduct occurred while performing discretionary as opposed to
ministerial acts”); Chirieleison v. Lucas, 72 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (“a municipal employee is
liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental
acts”).
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policy decisions which are characterized by an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or
discretion.”149 For example, a city exercises discretion when it selects and adopts a public
improvement plan, but carrying out the plan involves ministerial actions that must be carried out
in a reasonably safe manner.150
Notably, many states include a “dangerous conditions exception” to sovereign immunity
in their tort claims acts, allowing law suits arising from a government entity’s maintenance of
property it owns.151 For example, Pennsylvania waives immunity for tort claims arising out of its
control of, among other things, “utility service facilities,” which include storm water
management systems.152 Statutes carving out such an exception generally impose “a broad duty
… to maintain safe public places.”153 Under this exception, however, the plaintiff must show that
the government either created the dangerous condition causing the plaintiff’s injury or should
have known of the condition.154
2. Negligence elements
Once a plaintiff overcomes a sovereign immunity defense, a governmental entity is
generally subject to the same rules of liability that apply to nongovernmental entities. 155 Litigants
149

6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:47.

150

Trotter, supra note 23.
Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 336 (2d ed.) (“States also tend to
eliminate immunity for injuries resulting from badly maintained government property.”). Statutory exceptions to
sovereign immunity for public property include: 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542 (a local entity may be liable for “the
care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency”); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-106
(sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of
any public property, including buildings, highways, and power facilities); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.600 (immunity of
the public entity is expressly waived for injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property); and Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1406 (governmental agencies liable for injury resulting from dangerous condition of a
public building if agency had knowledge of the defect and failed to remedy the condition or take action reasonably
necessary to protect the public against the condition.).
152
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(5); Rooney v. City of Philadelphia, 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
151

153

6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:66.

154

Bonilla v. Starrett City at Spring Creek, 704 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. 2000) (“To impose liability upon the
defendants, there must be evidence tending to show the existence of a dangerous or defective condition and that the
defendants either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it and failed to remedy it within a
reasonable time); Willis v. City of New Bern, 529 S.E.2d 691, 693 (N.C. 2000) (granting summary judgment for the
defendant city where the plaintiff did not offer proof that the city had notice of the defect causing her injury); Isbell
v. Maricopa Cnty., 9 P.3d 311, 314 (Ariz. 2000) (a plaintiff need not establish “notice” if a government agency itself
creates or causes the dangerous condition.); Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 15 (Tenn. 1997) (The
government has “constructive notice” of a dangerous condition where it could have been discovered by proper
diligence and it had a duty to inquiring into it.’”).
155

Indeed, courts have imposed liability on the basis of private property owners’ failure to act to prevent damage
from natural disasters. For example, in California, the owners of an unreinforced building were found to be
negligent when they failed to retrofit the building, and two people inside were killed during an earthquake. Myrick v.
Mastagni, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1082, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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seeking to establish a negligence claim against governments that refuse to prepare for climate
change would need to show that 1) the official had a duty to prepare for extreme weather events;
2) the official breached that duty by failing to prepare or causing others to fail to prepare; 3) the
litigant suffered harm; and 4) this harm was caused or worsened by the government official’s
breach of duty. While climate change adaptation litigation is a new phenomenon,156 analyzing
the elements of a negligence claim in this context does not require novel legal theories.157
First, the extent of a government’s obligation to protect people and ecosystems from the
impacts of climate change may be determined by state statute. For example, in Illinois and many
other states, local governments have an explicit duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain public
property in a reasonably safe condition.158 Plaintiffs should consider basing allegations of
government negligence for failing to prepare for climate change on this prevalent statutorily
prescribed government obligation. Many states have enacted statutes enumerating the specific
obligations of local and state governments.159
Courts may also consider “compelling policy concerns”160 to expand the scope of the
government’s duty beyond those expressed in a state statute.161 Such policy concerns include the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the capacity of the parties to bear the loss, and the
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care. 162 As scientists work to
refine predictions of the risk of extreme weather and associated damage to life and property, as
156

Maxine Burkett, Litigating Climate Change Adaptation: Theory, Practice, and Corrective (Climate) Justice, 42
Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 11144, 11156 (2012) (observing that no climate change adaptation cases had been
filed through the end of 2012).
157
Id., at 11146 (“[T]ort law is well-equipped in both purpose and function to address the challenges of adapting.”).
158

745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/3-102. For additional examples of statutes defining a state’s duty to maintain public
property, see note 26.
159
See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx (listing state tort claims
acts); see, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 745, §§ 5/1 et seq.; Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, §§ 8521 et seq.; Cal. Gov. Code §§
815, et seq.
160

Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to
Climate Change, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 775, 786 (2013).
161

See Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 734 A.2d 762, 768 (N.J. 1999) (Even in cases where a common law immunity
has been incorporated into or codified by statute, it remains subject to judicial modification); Donaca v. Curry Cnty.,
734 P.2d 1339 (Or. 1987) (finding that a county’s liability for failure to maintain the grass at an intersection where
an automobile accident occurred depended on “the existence and magnitude of the risk at the intersection…[and the]
feasibility and cost of avoiding the risk….”); Fazzolari By & Through Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 717
P.2d 1210 (Or. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (finding that a jury could reasonably conclude that a
public school had a duty to protect a student who was attacked on school grounds, after another person had been
raped on campus two weeks earlier); Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra note 23 (in case against
city, listing variables to be considered in determining if a duty exists, including the foreseeability of the harm and
the burden on the city of imposing a duty to exercise care).
162
See, e.g., Ameriwood Indus. Int’l Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 961 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1997);
Torres v. Graves, No. 92-CV-4449, 1993 WL 19753, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993); Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F.
Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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manifested in vulnerability assessments, these impacts are increasingly foreseeable. Moreover,
governments will almost always have a greater capacity to bear losses than individuals. And
imposing a duty on governments to prepare for climate change will generally yield positive
outcomes for communities that will otherwise be vulnerable to devastation from natural disasters
and other climate risks. In short, policy concerns may support the imposition of a governmental
duty to act to protect citizens from potential harm by implementing appropriate climate change
adaptation measures.163
Some jurisdictions adhere to the “public duty doctrine,” which provides that
governmental entities and their agents owe duties only to the general public, not to individuals,
absent a “special relationship” or “special duty” between the entity and the injured party.164 The
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois did so in a case brought against several municipalities by
plaintiffs alleging a failure to prepare for climate change: the court held that the city defendants
did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs in connection with their performance of public
duties.165 A litigant may overcome this public duty defense by showing that the government
voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff in particular.166 Doing so creates a special relationship
between the plaintiff and a governmental agency and with it a duty of care towards the individual
even for discretionary functions.167 A special relationship may arise when the government
performs an affirmative act, or makes a specific promise or representation that under the
circumstances creates a justifiable reliance on the part of the person injured.168 Notably, many
states have abandoned the public duty doctrine altogether.169 Given its potential application to
163

Duty and Breach, supra note __, at 786.
City Of Toccoa v. Pittman, 648 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Stone v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Labor, 495
S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1998).
164

165

Tzakis, supra note __, April 3 Order re PDR Decision as to LPES and other issues, https://perma.cc/LD7X-94QX
(finding the public entity defendants immune under Illinois’ Public Duty Rule (citing Harinek v. 161 N. Clark
St./Ltd Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 345-47 (Ill. 1998)).
166
6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:48; see also Souder v. Cannon, 235 S.W.3d 841, 852 (Tex. App. 2007).
167

Japan Airlines Co. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 178 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (there is no
governmental immunity where a special relationship exists between the governmental entity and the injured party);
Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Once defendant agreed to perform certain tasks,
“his actions ceased to be discretionary actions and became merely operational level activities which must be
performed with reasonable care and for which there is no sovereign immunity.”).
168
6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:48; 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 43 P.3d
1233, 1240 (Wash. 2002) (plaintiff demonstrated a special relationship with respect to the government’s
maintenance of a storm drain system by showing direct contact between a government official and herself, express
assurances given by a public official, and justifiable reliance on those assurances.)
169

Jean W. v. Com., 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993) (abolishing public duty doctrine in Massachusetts); Adams v.
State, 555 P.2d 235, 243 (Alaska 1976) (abolishing public duty doctrine and applying traditional negligence analysis
to government); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (same); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (public
duty doctrine held no longer applicable in Colorado); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d
1010 (Fla. 1979) (holding governmental negligence to be determined by non-public entity standards); Wilson v.
Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (abolishing public duty doctrine); Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs, 687
P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (public duty doctrine abolished by statute); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or.
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circumstances in which state or local government actors seek to protect individuals from heat
waves or floods but fall short, climate change might push the remaining states to do so as well.
Establishing that a government has an affirmative duty to act is more difficult than
establishing that the government must exercise due care when it chooses to act. For example,
showing that the government was negligent for failing to build a levee may present greater
challenges than showing that the government was negligent in building a levee that was poorly
designed or inadequately maintained, since the former might be said to require a greater degree
of discretion. Even where a litigant ostensibly seeks damages for a government’s “failure to act,”
however, it may be possible to characterize the government’s obligation in other terms. 170 Since
state governments make decisions in the context of an existing web of infrastructure, such as
sewer systems and levees, the distinction between the duty to maintain government-owned
property and to build new structures can be blurry.171
Importantly, even where a government action is shielded by discretionary immunity, if
that action ultimately creates a dangerous condition known to the government but not readily
apparent to people who could be injured by the condition, the governmental entity must take
steps to avert the danger or properly warn people of the danger.172 For example, in City of St.
Petersburg v. Collom, three individuals drowned when they fell into open storm drainage ditches
owned by the city.173 The court expressed doubt that the city defendant could be held liable for
defects in its “overall plan for the drainage system,” since such planning constitutes a
discretionary function.174 The St. Petersburg court held, nonetheless, that the plaintiffs had stated
a cause of action against the city defendant for its failure to either warn people of the open drain
hazard or to correct the dangerous condition by adding fences or other barriers around the
ditches.175 According to the St. Petersburg court, “a governmental entity may not create a known

1979) (abolishing public duty doctrine); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976) (same); DeWald v.
State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) (same).
170

See Jean W. v. Com., supra note __, at 312 (providing examples of cases that could be characterized either as
cases of misfeasance or nonfeasance).
171
See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 Mich. L. Rev.
345, 348 (2014) (arguing, in the Takings Clause context, that “[p]reexisting regulatory intervention means that the
government should not be able to wash its hands of responsibility now.”)
172
City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982); Jezek v. City of Midland, 605 S.W.2d 544,
548 (Tex.1980); see also Larson v. Township of New Haven, 165 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. 1969); Teall v. City of
Cudahy, 386 P.2d 493 (Cal. 1963); Lowman v. City of Mesa, 611 P.2d 943 (Ariz. App. 1980).
173
City of St. Petersburg, supra note __.
174
Id., at 1086 (“defects inherent in the overall plan for an improvement, as approved by a governmental entity, are
not matters that in and of themselves subject the entity to liability”) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d
1071 (Fla. 1982)).
175
Id., at 1085–87.
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hazard or trap and then claim immunity from suit for injuries resulting from that hazard on the
grounds that it arose from a judgmental, planning-level decision.”176
Assuming that a government entity has a duty to take action to protect citizens from the
impacts of climate change, what would constitute a breach of that duty? The failure to provide
complete protection from harm clearly does not itself constitute a breach of duty. 177 Instead,
establishing a breach of the duty to prepare for the impacts of climate change would likely
require a showing that the government’s inaction exposed people to unnecessary risks. In this
context, significant deference to the government in weighing the costs and benefits of its actions
is certainly appropriate. Deference should not, however, “amount to abdication of oversight in
the context of either action or inaction.”178
The well-known “Hand formula” is a useful starting point in determining whether a
defendant has breached his duty of care,179 but would likely be difficult for courts to apply amid
climatic changes. Generally, the formula dictates that a person breaches his duty where the
likelihood of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm is greater than the cost of preventing that
harm.180 In the context of a case alleging failure to prepare for climate change, the likelihood of
harm is the chance of a particular event, such as a heat wave or a 100-year flood,181 at the time of
176

Id., at 1086; see also Rooney, supra note __ (finding that a city may not be held liable for an inadequate storm
water management system, but it may be liable for damages resulting from negligence in the construction or
maintenance of the sewer system).
177
Instead, courts may find that a government has fulfilled its duty where its actions were justified by the
information and resources available at the time of the action or omission at issue Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 718 P.2d
1086, 1090 (Haw. 1986) (“Government is not intended to be an insurer of all the dangers of modern life, despite its
ever-increasing effort to protect its citizens from peril.”); Jean W. v. Com., supra note 43, at 314-15 (“Police
departments are no more responsible for every harm that befalls victims of crime than fire departments are
responsible for every sparking of a fire, and neither should be an insurer of every loss sustained in those contexts.”).
178
Serkin, supra note __, at 385.
179
Dobbs, supra note 26 § 161 (“If the defendant's cost of preventing the harm is less than the expected value of the
harm itself, he is definitely negligent and liable under the Hand formula”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291
(1965) (“Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the
risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”).
180
In re City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 522 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying
the Hand Formula to determine whether the City of New York was negligent in connection with an accident on the
Staten Island Ferry); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Under the Hand formula, a defendant is negligent if the burden (cost) of the precautions that he could have taken to
avoid the accident…is less than the loss that the accident could reasonably be anticipated to cause…, discounted
(i.e., multiplied) by the probability that the accident would occur unless the precautions were taken.”); Levi v. Sw.
Louisiana Elec. Membership Co-op. (SLEMCO), 542 So. 2d 1081, 1087 (La. 1989) (“When the product of the
possibility of [injury] multiplied times the gravity of the harm, if it happens, exceeds the burden of precautions, the
failure to take those precautions is negligence”); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (L. Hand, J.) (“if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL”).
181
FEMA defines a 100-year flood as a flood with a 1% likelihood of occurring or being exceeded in any given
year, based on historical data. FEMA, Flood Zones, http://www.fema.gov/flood-zones. Climate change has
increased the risk of a 100-year flood in many areas such that the actual chance of such a flood is great than 1%.
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the event. Since climate change is causing global alterations in the frequency, severity, and
geographic distribution of significant adverse events, historical data will become less predictive
of future events’ probabilities. Instead, best estimates of the likelihood of harm must also draw
on expert weather and climate projections.182 Moreover, the probability of a natural disaster
should be based on its cumulative chance over a relevant period of time – perhaps from the time
the government defendant should have been aware of the relevant climate projections to the date
of the event – rather than in one particular year;183 since resiliency measures are implemented for
the long term, it is irrelevant to the question of breach whether a natural disaster occurs one year
versus the next.
For the purposes of applying the Hand formula, the magnitude of the harm should be
measured by the predicted loss of property and life likely to result from a particular event.
Hurricane Sandy caused over $50 billion in damage,184 and Hurricane Katrina left in its wake
over $100 billion in damage.185 Even if such events are infrequent, the extent of the devastation
they cause justifies taking precautionary measures to minimize potential damage.186
Other factors may be relevant to whether a governments’ failure to act was reasonable,
including the precision and accuracy of available climate projections, access to technical and
monetary resources, the extent to which the precautions would have reduced or eliminated the
damage, any negative consequences of the precautionary measures beyond their expense, and
alternative measures taken by the state or city to adapt to climate change. Ultimately, the plaintiff
“need[s] to prove the unreasonableness of [the] defendant’s actions in light of the well-

182

Long-term projections of future weather and climate conditions often provide a wide range of possible outcomes.
See, e.g., See, e.g., C. Rosenzweig, W. Solecki, A. DeGaetano, M. O’Grady, S. Hassol, P. Grabhorn, Responding to
climate change in New York State: the ClimAID integrated assessment for effective climate change adaptation, Ann.
N. Y. Acad. Sci., 1244 (2011), pp. 2–649, https://perma.cc/KJ6X-3Y8L (predicting sea level rise in New York City
between 15 and 75 inches by 2100). Some courts may be unpersuaded that governments should be held liable for
failing to act on uncertain projections. Nonetheless, such projections may play a larger role in courts’ liability
determinations as scientists continue to refine climate models, increasing both their accuracy and precision.
183
The cumulative risk of a particular event increases as the time span increases. For example, while the risk of a
100-year flood may be approximately 1% within the next year, there is at least a 26% chance of a 100-year flood
over the next 30 years. United States Geological Survey, 100-Year Flood–It’s All About Chance (April 2010),
https://perma.cc/9H5N-JFNE.
184
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Service
Assessment Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, October 22–29, 2012 (May 2013), https://perma.cc/2F3BH38Z.
185
NOAA, The Deadliest, Costliest, And Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (and
other frequently requested hurricane facts) (Aug. 2011), https://perma.cc/QCT6-KL6K.
186
In re City of New York, supra note __, at 242 (comparing, without quantifying, “[t]he probability … of a scenario
where the pilot [of the Staten Island Ferry] would become incapacitated … [with] [t]he gravity of … resulting injury
to its passengers” against the burden of enforcing a safety measure that would have prevented the accident to finding
New York City negligent); Duty and Breach, supra note __, at 781-82 (“Sandy also underscores the need for local
governments to appreciate fully the costs of, to date, low probability yet unprecedented and devastating events.”).
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established science of climate change.”187 While certainly a “formidable task,” increasing
knowledge of climate change risks should increase the potential for liability. 188
Establishing the damage element of a negligence claim in this context would not differ
materially from a typical negligence case. A litigant would have to show that he suffered an
injury to his person or property. These types of injuries are “especially present in the climate
adaptation context.”189 For example, where flooding causes widespread property damage or a
heat wave increases mortality rates, many people will have suffered a clear and legally
cognizable injury. Nonetheless, some states impose statutory dollar limitations to limit the
amount that can be recovered against a government entity.190
To establish the causation prong of a claim for negligent failure to prepare for climate
change, the plaintiff would need to show, as in any negligence case, that the defendant’s breach
of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The question in this context is whether
the government’s failure to take reasonable measures to protect people from the natural disaster
at issue caused the damage.
The plaintiff must identify measures the government could have taken to prevent the
injury. Plaintiffs should challenge the city’s failure to upgrade or build or upgrade specific
infrastructure, rather than the city’s failure to consider climate change impacts in its planning
documents, since the latter theory would also require the plaintiff to establish that the
infrastructure would have been upgraded if the planning had been carried out. The litigant would
not need to show that the natural disaster at issue was caused by climate change. 192 Instead, the
191

187

Litigating Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 156, at 11145.
Id.; see also Attribution of Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change, National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016).
189
Id. at 11148.
190
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-114; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-29; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.04.
188

191

See Rooney, supra note 27 (plaintiffs’ claim that city’s negligent maintenance of sewer system caused flood
damage survived summary judgment motion where plaintiffs presented evidence that clogged sewers caused the
flooding and city had notice of the condition); Gaylord ex rel. Gaylord v. Morris Twp. Fire Dep’t, 853 A.2d 1112,
1116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (Municipal liability arising from real property ownership only available where the
defect of the land itself causes the injury).
192

Issues of causation raise more difficult questions in the context of a climate nuisance suit, since “current
atmospheric levels of GHGs result from the cumulative emissions of millions or billions of emitters since the onset
of the industrial revolution[, and] no specific injury can be attributed to any specific polluter.” Michael Gerrard,
What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, YALE L. J. ONLINE (Sept. 2011); Litigating Climate
Change Adaptation, supra note 30, at 11145 (observing that “establishing the causal link between a defendant’s
emissions and the alleged harms” would be the most challenging task for a plaintiff seeking tort remedies from
greenhouse gas emitters).
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effect of climate change on the likelihood of the weather event would be a factor in the
determination of breach and foreseeability, as discussed above.193
As natural disasters become more likely – and, therefore, more foreseeable – due to
climate change, governments face the risk of being found liable for refusing to take reasonable
actions to prepare for the impacts of climate change. This type of litigation can serve the duel
purposes of compensating plaintiffs for injuries and encouraging governments to better adapt to
climate change.
Conclusion

193

Litigating Climate Change Adaptation, supra note __, at 11150 (“Attributing extreme weather events to climate
change…will occur at the state of establishing defendant’s breach of duty….”).
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